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A B S T R A C T 
The common and dominant view that customary land tenure systems in Africa are inefficient because they forbid 
individuation, are not registered, are insecure, discourage access to credit, and provide incentive for free rider 
problems is examined through a case study of one community in Ghana, West Africa. A ninety-day field study in the 
case study area explored the extent to which the land tenure system has supported a community-based housing project 
and how that, in turn, has shaped or constrained infrastructural and socio-economic and political development. The 
paper reveals that communal ownership in the case study area deviates from the orthodox description of land tenure 
systems in Africa and escapes the problems associated with the so-called ‘tragedy of the commons’. Abuse by both the 
corporation and corporators is possible and probable, but not because of custom. Growing processes of modernisation, 
commodification, and secularisation will undermine this system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade, orthodox economists have written 
widely about the stresses of land tenure systems in 
Africa (De Soto, 2000; 2004; Singh and Huang, 2011). 
The argument is that these communities have open 
range land rights systems which are abused, are 
insecure, impede access to credit, and are inappropriate 
for the purpose of public administration and planning. 
They imply that the systems are backward and are in 
need of transformation to a more formal, Western  
system of land tenure relations. Countries in the Global 
South, especially those in Africa, have been promised 
considerable prosperity if they shed off their system of 
land use and ownership and embrace a Western version 
of securing property rights. 
The argument against customary land ownership is not 
new. It is traceable to the work of Hardin (1968) whose 
influential paper, ‘the tragedy of the commons’, claimed 
that common pooli resources tend to be mismanaged 
because people are individualistic, selfish, and 
profit oriented. From this perspective, there is a tragedy 
if there is no individuation and no markets in land.  For 
Hardin, common property is an aberration and its ills are 
intensified by population growth. While he considers 
privatising the commons may be unjust, he argues that 
‘[t]he alternative of the commons is too horrifying to 
contemplate. Injustice is preferable to total ruin’ 
(Hardin, 1968, p. 1247). Land tenure systems in Africa 
are commonly believed (see, for example, World Bank, 
1975; 2003) to fit this open range system. Being 
customary is equated with being open range, being 
undefined, being waste or ‘no person’s land’, and being 
incapable of exchange (World Bank, 1975; De Soto, 
2000; Deininger, 2003; Norberg, 2006) a view based on 
which expensive and extensive land reform programmes 
have been carried out in Africa (Gilbert, 2012). 
Many scholars, writing from different disciplinary 
backgrounds, have contested the claims of the private 
property view point. Some contest its assumptions 
(Sjaastad and Cousins, 2008); others its empirical 
support (Domeher and Abdulai, 2012), and a few its 
various conceptions (Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006). 
The new twist in the debate is the debate about the so-
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called ‘investment in land for development’, that is, the 
use of customary land tenure systems and private 
individual rights to bring about pro-poor growth (Borras 
Jr and Franco, 2012). 
Whether customary land rights contribute to community 
development is relatively understudied, with a few 
notable exceptions (e.g., Kea, 2010; Berry, 2013; 
Goodwin, 2013). So we conducted fieldwork in Agona, a 
peri-urban community in Ghana, West Africa, where the 
rights to land are customary. We studied the Habitat for 
Humanity Housing Scheme in one community and 
analysed how it takes advantage of the customary 
system to enhance community development, an aspect 
of which appeared in an earlier report (Aryee et al., 
2005). This further analysis extends the literature on 
land rights formalisation which currently focuses on six 
themes, namely whether formalisation leads to access to 
credit (e.g., Domeher and Abdulai, 2012), the benefits of 
the Land Administration Project (e.g., Hammond, 2008), 
women’s land rights and customary land ownership 
(e.g., Duncan, 2010) and problems in the land market 
(e.g., Karley, 2009), transformations in land tenure (e.g., 
Amanor, 2010), and the history of land, labour, and 
capital (e.g., Austin, 2005). This paper, on the other 
hand, stresses the community development angles of the 
customary system of land tenure. It is an important 
addition to studies on the politics of land reform in 
Africa (see Lund and Boone, 2013 on an overview of 
such studies). 
The paper reveals that (1) the customary land tenure 
system is communal but not an open range common 
pool system  with no rules, explaining why it can escape 
the so-called tragedy of the commons and (2) even 
without formalisation, the customary system works to 
the common good of community members; (3) the 
customary system of land tenure derives its social good 
character not from the inherent tenurial arrangement 
itself, but from collective decision making protocols; (4) 
social credit is possible under customary land tenure 
system; and (5) there is security of tenure arising from 
collective social regulation, not necessarily enforced by 
the state. 
Following this introduction, the paper is divided into 
four sections. Section 1 reviews the argument in favour 
of individualising land tenure. Section 2 introduces the 
community where the fieldwork was undertaken. First, 
it explores the geography, demography, and land tenure 
system of the community. Next, it describes the Habitat 
for Humanity Housing Scheme. Then, it raises the 
research questions based on which the fieldwork was 
conducted. Section 3 describes the method used to 
collect data from the field, while section 4 discusses and 
analyses the findings. 
The Case for Individual Tenure Explained: While 
some anthropologists and other social scientists have 
continued to extol the benefits of customary land tenure 
systems (e.g., Alden Wily, 2011; 2012), neoclassical 
economists and advocates of neoliberalism have 
consistently argued that individual and Western forms 
of land tenure are more desirable and ought, therefore, 
to be imposed in areas where they are non-existent. The 
characteristics of these Western tenurial arrangements 
include formal title registration, regarding land as an 
asset that must be traded to be efficient, and subdividing 
customary land. Variations of these ideas, incorporating 
state planning, and intended to enhance the operation of 
land markets have also been advocated (Lai and Lorne, 
2006; Lai, 2010). 
The World Bank has been championing these views 
since the 1970s. In its seminal report on land, Land 
Policy Reform (World Bank, 1975), a strong case was 
made for the use of formal title registers, individual 
tenure, and promoting market exchange in land. Its lead 
economist with responsibility for land and development 
economics, Klaus Deininger, was later to publish a paper 
reporting that the World Bank had changed its views 
(Deininger and Binswanger, 1999). The revised World 
Bank position is stated in its 2003 report, Land Policy for 
Growth and Poverty Reduction (Deininger, 2003). Like 
the 1999 paper, the World Bank stresses its change in 
orientation, but a critical reading reveals that the 
structural argument remains the same or similar: The 
marketization of land is key for economic development 
and poverty reduction; Customary land requires 
recording and state backing to be secure; Secure tenure 
is given by government through enforcing formal land 
rights; Women’s rights are better guaranteed by formal 
rights; More formal tenure is the only reason credit can 
be given; Customary tenure ought to evolve to individual 
tenure in the process of economic development; and 
Land must be regarded as an ‘asset’ and its exchange 
encouraged (Deininger, 2003, pp. xvii –xlvi). 
Supporting analyses, recommending greater private 
property and the demise of customary tenure, have 
come from many orthodox economists, but recently 
from the Peruvian economist, Hernando de Soto (see de 
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Soto, 2000, 2004) and Johan Norberg, especially in his 
book, In Defence of Global Capitalism (Norberg, 2005, pp. 
32-36; 51-57). Criticisms of these proposals have grown 
(see, for example, the papers in Benda-Beckmann et al., 
2009), but these recommendations have been widely 
embraced in Africa (Gilbert, 2012). It will be wrong, 
however, to contend that the experience of title 
registration in Africa is only a post-colonial dynamic.  
The coloniser attempted and, in some countries, 
succeeded in bureaucratically manage land. Thus, 
registration is both a colonial and neocolonial attempt to 
commodify and secularise tenurial arrangements which, 
even when not common pool are communal, customary, 
and non-Western (Njoh, 2012). 
Most critical studies (e.g., Abdulai, 2006; Hammond, 
2008, Gilbert, 2012) on the issue of formalisation have 
contested the claims on the basis that the transformed 
system does not work. Important questions remain, 
nevertheless, about customary tenancies themselves: 
How do they operate? Do they and in what ways do they 
define, constrain, enhance or obstruct pro-poor growth 
and development? 
Ghana presents an interesting case study because, while 
its land tenure system has undergone major 
transformations, and have been vigorously subjected to 
tenure registration and formalisation, a substantial 
share remains customary. Yet, the existing studies have 
tended to focus more on the effectiveness of registration 
(e.g., Hammond, 2008; Aryeetey and Udry, 2010) and 
less on how peri-urban and unregistered land performs, 
with Bugri (2008) and Berry (2013) as respectable 
exceptions. 
Land Tenure in Ghana: Land tenure in Ghana is a 
complex mix of state, customary, and individual systems 
of use, ownership, and transfer. By definition, state land 
belongs to the state and is governed by formal laws. 
Customary land, on the other hand, is largely managed 
along customary rules. It is held by the traditional 
leaders (e.g. chiefs and priests) and families for the 
individuals of the community. So, it does not preclude 
individual ownership, but the individual’s title is usually 
inferior to the community, family, or other group’s 
interest in the sense that it is less absolute. It is the 
community or, what Bentsi-Enchil, called the 
‘corporation’ that owns the highest interest in land and 
the chief or priest that is the trustee or, in Betsi-Enchil’s 
terms, ‘corporator’ (Asabre, 1994). Family ownership is 
largely regarded as deriving from community interest 
too, (e.g., either as a gift from the community or a 
purchase by the entire family from a community),  so it 
is the community, ipso facto, that holds the original 
allodial interest (Woodman, 1963; Nana Nketsiah, 2013).  
While some hold the view that customary land could 
never be sold, there is proof that even in pre-colonial 
Ghana land markets existed although they were not 
capitalist in nature (see Asante, 1965). 
The advent of colonialism introduced two important 
changes. First, the coloniser tried to confiscate 
customary land under the guise of ‘waste land’ or ‘no 
man’s land’. This attempt was rejected by the natives 
who formed the Aborigines’ Rights Protection Society to 
defend traditional land. The coloniser backed off, 
eventually, and then adopted a second approach – 
commodification of land to ensure the transfer of land to 
business magnates from the coloniser’s country. 
Working in cahoots with comprador traditional rulers, 
greatly incentivised by the prospects of accumulating 
personal wealth, large amounts of land were sold 
(Kimble, 1964; Austin, 2005). A third, related policy of 
expropriation and appropriation was also used. 
Expropriation entailed the use of the power of eminent 
domain to compulsorily acquire land  from indigenous 
owners in Southern Ghana who were paid compensation 
whose adequacy or promptness are yet to be fully 
studied. Appropriation entailed the confiscation of land 
from Northern Ghana without the payment of 
compensation (Larbi et al., 2004). These three 
approaches substantially disturbed the nature of pre-
colonial land tenure systems. 
Since colonial times, the two forces, one of eminent 
domain, and the other of marketization have remained. 
On the first one, Larbi (2008) has discussed the various 
laws used for compulsory acquisition, including the State 
Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125) as amended, the Land 
(Statutory Way leaves) Act, 1963, (Act 186), State 
Property and Contracts, Act, 1960 (CA 6), the 
Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123) and the 
Public Conveyancing Act, 1965 (Act302). The 
Constitution of Ghana also gives the state the power to 
confiscate land. According to Larbi (2008), some 20 per 
cent of all the land in Ghana has been confiscated by the 
state. 
Successive governments have also been making effort to 
introduce formal registration and commodification.  
More concrete plans started when the Land 
Administration Research Centre submitted proposals for 
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a land title registration system on August 2, 1976. In 
January 1977, the proposals were approved for 
implementation. The objectives of title registration as 
stated were to ‘(a) simplify land transactions, in 
particular, by simplifying the conveyance itself and the 
number of subsequent administrative steps; such a 
register would enhance the need for introspective check 
on root of title; (b)[t]o provide security to the title 
holder against any subsequent claims of interests, and 
by providing state guarantee of the authenticity of the 
title; (c)[t]o save time and expense for the parties to a  
conveyance, or land change, and for the administrators 
of the system d) to provide a means of storing the Title 
information that (i) keeps the material safely (b) enables 
quick retrieval of the information from the register for 
the public’ (Benneh, 1980, p.20). 
According to George Benneh, then the Minister in charge 
of lands, ‘[t]he innovation of Title registration provides a 
sense of security  for all persons in their land 
transactions, and, from the state’s point of view, allows 
its chief asset, the land, to  circulate with speed, 
simplicity, low cost, and safety’ (Benneh, 1980, p.xxi). 
It took some six years after these proposals and claims 
were made before the Land Title Registration Law, 1986 
was enacted by the government that implemented it as 
part of the Structural Adjustment Program. In 1999, The 
Ghana National Land Policy (Ministry of Lands and 
Forestry, 1999) was launched and, in 2003, the Land 
Administration Project was started to implement the 
objectives of the Land Policy, mainly to formalise the 
land tenure system because indigenous systems do not 
work well, impede women’s access to land rights, inhibit 
access to credit, and create conflict in terms of access to 
land (for a discussion, see World Bank, 2011, pp. 1-5). 
A number of eminent scholars have contested the view 
that formal, Western form of tenure is the only one that 
enures to the common good of society and that common 
and community resources constrain development. For 
instance, Elinor Ostrom, first female to win the Nobel 
Prize in Economic Science, observed in her stimulating 
book, Governing the Commons (Ostrom, 1990) that 
‘instead of presuming that the individuals sharing a 
commons are inevitably caught in a trap from which 
they cannot escape, I argue that the capacity of 
individuals to extricate themselves from various types of 
dilemma situations varies from situation to 
situation….(p.14). To open up the discussion of 
institutional options for solving commons dilemmas, I 
want now to present a fifth game in which the herders 
themselves can make a binding contract to commit 
themselves to a cooperative strategy that they 
themselves will work out’ (p.15). 
So, it is important not only to evaluate whether the 
market alternative works, but also to examine whether 
traditional systems fail, as critics claim. Herein lies the 
mandate of this paper. Its empirical referent is Agona, a 
peri-urban settlement in the Ashanti Region of Ghana 
where the traditional system of land tenure is in 
operation. 
Afigya Sekyere District (or Sekyere South District), 
Agona: Case Study Area: The Ashanti region of Ghana is 
one of the ten regions in the country. It is one of the most 
populous. Rich in both minerals and culture, it is a 
prominent tourist site in Africa. The Afigya Sekyere 
district is one of the 30 political administrative units in 
the Ashanti region. It was established in 1974 during 
which time it was called the Kwabre District. With the 
expansion of its boundaries in 1988, the Government of 
Ghana, using LI 1606, changed that name to the Afigya 
Sekyere District (Aryee et al., 2005) and recently to 
Sekyere South District. 
Physically, the district is about 3.3 per cent of the entire 
region. Some of the towns that make up the district are  
Tano, Kona, and Wiamoase. Since 1984, the district has 
been growing at an average rate of 3.1 per cent. About 
130, 000 people reside in the district composed of 125 
settlements of which only 5 are urban (defined as 
settlements of 5, 000 or more people) (Boateng, 2008; 
Ayarkwa, 2013). 
One of such urban centres is Agona, where the present 
study was carried out.Only the results of the penultimate 
census are available to the public. According to that 
census, conducted in 2000, Agona has a population of 
9,321 people of whom about 50 per cent are female. On 
average, the population has been growing at 2.7 per cent 
since 1984 (Aryee et al., 2005). 
Sixty four per cent of the people in Agona work as 
farmers, so the local economy is predominantly agrarian. 
The land tenure system is customary, which means that 
it is governed mainly by rules of custom, not statute. 
Unlike the situation in the bigger district, where most 
land is owned by families (Ibel, 2009), land is owned by 
the community in Agona and held in trust by a 
traditional chief who is supported by a council of elders 
(Aryee et al., 2005). 
As with land, housing is predominantly communal. Most 
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of the houses are traditional compound houses which 
comprise several rooms (at least 8 rooms) that share a 
common compound and may be secured by a gate but 
for which the compound is itself not roofed. Kitchens, 
bathrooms, and toilets are all shared in these 
compounds (Afigya Sekyere District Assembly, 2005). A 
total of 811 houses and 1,834 households were counted 
in Agona in 2000. And, around that time, the average 
household size was 5.1 (Ghana Statistical Service, 2000). 
Apart from 29 per cent of the people who have 
individual tenure, most residents in Agona occupy 
houses free of charge, drawing on their connection to a 
larger family and hence being entitled to live in the 
family house which is the compound type too(Afigya 
Sekyere District Assembly, 2005). 
The Habitat for Humanity International is taking 
advantage of these communal characteristics of Agona to 
use housing as a vehicle for community development.
 
Figure 1: Site Plan, Okomfo-Anokye Habitat, Agona. Source: Habitat for Humanity Ghana, Agona Affiliate, 2005. 
Figure 1 shows a site plan of the housing scheme in 
Agona. The scheme seeks to provide a no interest 
building materials loan to the people in Agona to enable 
them to become homeowners. How the scheme works is 
that local people through their traditional leader make 
an application to the Habitat For Humanity International 
(or its representative in Ghana), demonstrating their 
readiness to provide land for the housing projects and 
the readiness of local people who constitute committees 
to determine eligibility based on membership of the 
community (for a more detailed description of the 
scheme, see Adarkwa and Oppong, 2007; Obeng-Odoom, 
2009). 
It is this nexus between communal land, communal 
spirit, and communal housing and how it impinges on 
community development that provides the context to 
consider the claim that the ‘Afro land tenure system’ 
(Asabre, 1994) – in which land is owned by the 
corporation and held in trust by corporators – is 
problematic. 
The questions we sought to answer are how the 
customary land tenure system shapes and constrains 
community development through the Habitat for 
Humanity Housing Scheme. The specific sectors of 
community life which we explored are housing provision 
and whether land rights are insecure, as suggested by 
critics of African land tenure systems, and whether 
housing is well maintained. We assess the extent to 
which the scheme has, in turn, impacted infrastructure 
provision, the provision of skill training to the 
community members, and enhanced poverty reduction. 
The Data: To gather the data needed to answer the 
research questions, we submitted initial questions for 
vetting by the Department of Land Economy, Kwame 
Nkrumah University of Science and Technology for 
screening or what is known in other jurisdictions as 
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‘Ethics Clearance’ before the Department introduced us 
to the community by a letter of support. Science and We 
gained community confidence as a result. 
We collected qualitative and quantitative data during a 
90 day field study in 2005. We designed four types of 
questionnaires. One set was to obtain data from people 
in the community who had benefitted from the housing 
scheme. The second set was to get data from community 
officials of the scheme. The third was designed to obtain 
data from national officials of the scheme. And the fourth 
was to guide us in interviewing the traditional authority 
(see attached appendices for details of the questions). 
The community existed on a 20.33-acre land and had 21 
blocks of houses, clearly divided by ‘lanes’ which served 
as strata for our stratified sampling made possible by 
our knowledge of the finite number of beneficiaries of 
the scheme. 
Table 1: Details of Interview 
Community Number of Homeowners Number of Respondents 
Percentage of 
Respondents (%) 
Agona 85 54 63.53 
 
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics on the 
interviewees and total number of beneficiaries of the 
scheme. Only 63.53 per cent responded because the rest 
were either working on the farm working or were away 
from the community for other reasons. We also obtained 
data through participant and non-participant 
observation on the field. Team members took turns 
observing and asking questions throughout the period of 
study. The questionnaires were structured, but the 
interviews themselves were recursive (Halse, 2011) to 
enable us probe deeper into the dynamics that we 
wanted to study. Figure 2 and Table 2 contain further 
descriptive information on the site and our respondents. 
 
Figure 2: Communities in the Afigya Sekyere District where Habitat for Humanity International - Ghana operates 
Source: Afigya Sekyere District Office, 2005. 
Table 2 contains a breakdown of the people we 
interviewed by occupation. The respondents were 
pooled from a range of occupations, but most of them 
were farmers. 
While we do not claim that the study is comprehensive, 
the ‘mix’ of respondents makes it possible for us to come 
close to telling the ‘story’ of the community through its 
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Table 2: Occupations of the Respondents at Agona 
Occupation Agona 
 Number Percentage 
Farming 34 62.96 
Petty trading 10 18.50 
Teaching 3 5.56 
Carpentry 1 1.86 
Masonry 1 1.86 
Security 2 3.70 
Cleaner 3 5.56 
Totals 54 100 
   
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The interviews showed that access to land ownership was not a problem, neither was it confusing or open to overuse. 
For these reasons, the investment in housing has worked well. Also, most people have obtained a dwelling which has 
at least two rooms, depending on how much the people can afford to pay.  The breakdown of the housing 
characteristics of the various housing designs is captured in Table 3. 





Other Descriptive characteristics 
% No. of 
beneficiaries 
A 168 
2 bedrooms, lounge, open verandah, and detached utility block 
(containing a toilet, bath, and kitchen), all on a 20” x 20” site 
13 
B 174 
2 bedrooms, lounge, open verandah, and detached utility block 
(containing a toilet, bath, and kitchen), all on a 31” x 13” site 
16 
C 138 
1 bedrooms, lounge, open verandah, and detached utility block 
(containing a toilet, bath, and kitchen), all on a 23” x 13” site 
31 
D 184 
2 bedrooms, 2 lounge rooms, open verandah, and 2 detached 
utility blocks (containing a toilet, bath, and kitchen), all on a 





2 bedrooms, hall, open verandah, and in built utility facility 
(containing a toilet, bath, and kitchen), all on a 31” x 20” site 
4 
Source: fieldwork 2005 
The rooms are fitted with halls and sanitary facilities, 
some of which are attached and others detached 
depending on personal preferences. While some 
community members raise problems of leaking roofs 
and cracks, compared to some of the rental housing units 
in compound houses in urban Ghana elsewhere (UN-
HABITAT, 2011), the situation in Agona seems less 
problematic. Contrary to the economistic narrative that 
it is the lack of individuation that explains poor 
maintenance, we found that the main driver of this 
problem in Agona is poverty and possible poor 
construction. 
Also, unlike the problems of insecure tenure which are 
commonly reported with renting private 
accommodation or living in private accommodation in 
urban areas in Ghana (UN-HABITAT, 2011), the people 
in Agona have secure land rights. Indeed, no one 
reported any problem of eviction or encroachment, 
although there is not elaborate title registration in the 
town other than a simple recording of who owns what 
house.  
The certificate of ownership  provided  does not confer 
the absolute title in land on the beneficiary of housing, so 
land is owned by the traditional authority even when a 
family member has a Certificate of Ownership. The 
interest in the house is synonymous with the interest in 
the land, namely usufructuary title and hence all the 
incidents thereof such as heritability.  The communal 
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nature of the tenure system, therefore, comes down to 
restrictions on what type of interest individuals have in 
land, what kinds of rules govern the operation of the 
tenure system, and the restrictions on the sale and rent 
of land. One of the incidents of the usufructuary interest 
is heritability, so upon the demise of the original owner, 
the house and the land on which it stands devolve to the 
successor of the deceased chosen customarily or legally 
as the case may be. Alternatively, if the death is intestate, 
the property will be shared according to the provisions 
of law (PNDCL 111). 
With binding restrictions on leasing out or sale of 
residential property, it may be argued that this imposes 
constraints on mobility and occupational choice. Our 
interviews included one case in which the original 
owner was working outside of Agona and a relative was 
occupying it on her behalf. So, there are practical ways of 
going around this dilemma. Also, it is arguable that 
migration will remove pressure on the system and so 
should not be regarded as a problem. 
Further, while in principle the system can become a 
source of disputes around intergenerational transfer of 
property, especially in cases where the parents have 
made significant investments into improvements or 
renovations of their houses, we did not encounter any 
such case. In practice, like the family system elsewhere 
in Africa, this system of large families will make it 
possible for a family member to occupy rent free. This is 
consistent with findings of people living rent-free in 
family houses elsewhere (Tipple et al., 1997; Tipple and 
Korboe, 2006; Tipple and Speak, 2009). In the event of 
death either inter vivos or interstate, matters of 
inheritance will be resolved by resort to the will of the 
deceased person or by resort to the Intestate Succession 
Law. While some cases are resolved by customary rules 
of sharing which, contingent on the type of system of 
inheritance, is discriminatory against women, such cases 
are weakening, although slowly (see Korboe, 1992; 
Gedzi, 2012) but the courts have shown great support 
for women in reinterpreting custom to be more women 
friendly (Ndulo, 2011; pp. 108 -110). 
In our case study, there was no evidence that the 
traditional authority discriminates against women in 
giving land out for the housing scheme. While most 
beneficiaries (76 per cent) are married and so it might 
be interpreted as women’s rights are contingent on their 
marital status, as reported elsewhere in Ghana (Duncan, 
2010), we observed that married couple dominate the 
scheme because they are better able to show ability to 
repay the building materials loan. According to the 
traditional authority, every native to whom land is given 
has a usufructuary interest or the customary freehold 
interest. The only requirement to obtain this interest is 
being a native and giving aseda or ‘drink money’ii to the 
traditional authority. The housing scheme itself does not 
discriminate on gender lines either. Similarly, there was 
no evidence of discrimination against people on 
religious grounds, although Christians dominated at 85 
per cent. The Muslims and traditionalists did not report 
being discriminated against. 
Through the scheme, the community has benefitted from 
water projects. The repayments from beneficiaries and 
donations to the community are invested in a revolving 
fund, part of which has been used to finance the sinking 
of a borehole in the community. At the time of the study, 
electricity was not available, but there were plans to 
provide it. The community has a post office, a digital 
radio access subscriber, few health centres, and 
basic/elementary and high schools. 
Some residents have developed skills in both 
craftsmanship and governance. Some have become 
carpenters, plumbers and masons, through the scheme. 
Others have developed skills in governance, as they 
learn to serve the community by serving on committees. 
The committee members are responsible for book 
keeping, storage, and education. There was no evidence 
of some people using the skill anywhere else outside of 
the community in a classic ‘brain drain’ style. 
Democracy is further enhanced through a system called, 
‘sweat equity’ by which people contribute their labour or 
food to assist others to build their houses. While the 
concept of sweat equity has experienced some 
challenges, relating to apathy on the part of people who 
have already built their houses, by either failing to turn 
up for ‘communal labour’ or sending some of their 
children to do sweat equity, on their behalf, drawing on 
Ostrom’s idea of establishing common and enforceable 
rules to manage common pool resources (Ostrom, 
1990), the communal spirit in Agona can be enhanced. 
While clearly the chieftaincy institution is one of 
dynastic arrangement and is therefore not democratic, 
we did not find any abuse of power by the traditional 
ruler through bribery or charging exorbitant drink 
money, a problem which has been reported elsewhere in 
Ghana (Ubink, 2007; Berry, 2013). It may be that the 
difference in Agona is the result of limited 
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commercialisation and hence inducement of capital, as 
the other factors in Ubink’s and Berry’s studies are 
similarly prevalent in Agona. The relationship between 
the Habitat for Humanity Housing Ghana and the 
traditional authority and the community leaders is very 
cordial. In turn, the traditional authority reported that it 
would be willing to release more land for the project. 
The customary land tenure system and the housing 
scheme in Agona have also impacted the levels of 
poverty in the community through political, 
environmental, economic, and social effects. Politically, 
the people in the community manage the housing 
scheme themselves, so they are obtaining some 
experience in governance. Socially, obtaining housing 
may be said to be a form of poverty reduction, as is the 
explicit attempt to overcome ethnic, gender, and 
religious biases that plague land tenure systems 
elsewhere. Environmentally, while there is scope to use 
more local materials to bring the cost of the housing 
projects further down, the processes of building are 
labour intensive with limited impact on the 
environment. While we did not find any evidence of a 
conscious effort to be ‘green’, the environment in Agona 
remains relatively undisturbed also because of the 
absence of large scale commercial and mechanised 
farming. 
Economically, unlike elsewhere in urban Ghana (Tipple, 
2006), the community does not use homes as a source of 
income or selling. Although a few people sell items like 
food in their houses, it is not allowed to sell the houses 
to other people to make extra money, in a typical 
neoclassical sense of the housing-economic development 
nexus (see de Soto, 2000; 2004). However, by comparing 
the situation of the beneficiaries ‘before and after’ the 
intervention, as Adarkwa and Oppong (2007) Obeng-
Odoom (2009) propose that such analysis proceeds, it 
becomes clear that the scheme has left important 
economic impacts. 
Also, the non-payment of rent and non-payment of 
labour cost in building may be said to be imputed gains 
from the system. In terms of inequality, however, we 
found no evidence that the scheme is trying to curtail the 
high levels of inequality in the community, arising from 
working different jobs. However, this downside cannot 
be blamed on the customary land tenure system. Rather, 
it provides a challenge for the community, the local, and 
central government institutions to consider. 
Conclusion and Key Lessons: These findings from 
Agona would suggest that the customary system of 
tenure is not only ‘customary’, but also ‘communal’. 
Further, the evidence suggests that it is possible to have 
a system of tenure which is largely unregistered and 
largely customary without abuses from either the 
corporators or the corporation. Thus, the abuse of 
customary system reported elsewhere in Ghana may not 
be inherent in the system itself. This micro, community 
study gives credence to the account of radical social 
scientists (e.g., Michalopoulos and Papajoannou, 2011) 
that it is the transformation and commercialisation of 
custom, which arose from the tendency of capital to 
expand, via both colonialism and now market-enhancing 
land registration systems, that disturb the nature of 
customary land rights. The gender angle in this account 
is interesting because it shows that traditional authority 
and institutions of governance can reinterpret custom to 
enhance gender sensitive development. 
These findings do not suggest that the experiences in 
Agona are the same elsewhere, but they do suggest that 
another system of land tenure, different from the market 
based and the abused customary system, is possible 
without their so-called pathogens. 
The story of customary tenure and housing development 
in Agona shows how the grand narrative of a free rider 
problem or tragedy of the commons can be misleading. 
Here is a community that works with and within a 
traditional system to meet its daily needs. The 
community collaborates to house one another using a 
‘common resource’ and their labour for a shared vision 
of community development. The problem of poor 
housing maintenance is not traceable to lack of 
individuation or simply weak individual property rights. 
Indeed, the notion of strong property rights is not tied to 
individuation. The people in the community have strong 
property rights in the commons and community 
members have security without individuation, titling, 
marketization, or state support. People can collaborate 
and the result will not always be ‘a tragedy’. 
A communal land management model is possible and 
desirable, especially if it removes biases on grounds of 
religion, ethnicity, race, age, and gender, and 
commercialisation is kept to a minimum.  In addition, the 
‘tragedy of the commons’ argument, referring to 
situations where there is rivalry in consumption (one 
person’s consumption reduces the amount available to
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others) and consumption is non-excludable (no one can 
be precluded from consuming), does not apply to all 
types of customary land tenure systems in Africa.  The 
context in Agona is that consumption is excludable, but 
non-rivalrous. Further, people do not simply act on their 
individual interests without considering community 
ethos. Thus, the ‘tragedy of the commons’ type of 
arguments are not applicable in all customary settings. 
Individual and families do have ‘ownership’ of the 
‘property’ they reside in, and they cannot be evicted, so 
they do enjoy the benefits of any improvements to the 
property they create, and there is social regulation about 
what to do and not to do, so this customary system using 
communal and common principles do not lead to the 
‘tragedy of the commons’ type problems such as 
insecurity of tenure. Credit is also advanced by the 
Habitat for Humanity Housing Scheme which offers 
credit for need; not for profit, so even if it is taken as 
crucial, the rules of credit can also be changed rather 
than simply making them friendlier to  markets. 
Population dynamics over time and their impact on the 
system ought to be studied in future, as a common view 
in the charge against customary system is that 
population growth destroys the commons. A summary 
rebuttal can be that population growth will not 
necessarily exert untold pressure on the customary 
model because vertical development and migration can 
provide a way of reducing the so-called stress on the 
system. 
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Questionnaires administered to beneficiaries of Habitat for Humanity Ghana. 
Kindly answer the following questions by ticking/filling where appropriate. Data collected will be treated with utmost 
confidentiality unless otherwise desired. 
Date of Interview…………………………….. 
Name of respondent…………………………..Location (House No.)……………………. 
1. Religion: Christianity [   ] Moslem [   ] Traditionalist [   ] others (specify)…………….. 
2a.. Age: <20 [      ]  20 – 30[     ];   31 – 40 [    ]    41 – 50 [   ]   60+ [     ] 
2b Household size (No)……………………….Sex:  Male [         ]       Female  [         ] 
3. Marital Status: Single [    ] Married [    ]  Divorced [    ]  Widowed [    ] Separated [    ] 
4. Hometown……………………………………Region………………………………….. 
5. .Main Occupation……………………………Secondary occupation…………………... 
6. Income per month: <100000 [   ] 100000-300000 [   ] 300000-400000 [   ] 500000+ [  ] 
7. What is the source of your water supply?  
      Pipe borne [       ]    Well [        ]   Borehole [    ]   Stream [    ]   Others (specify)…….. 
8a. What is the source of your energy supply?  
       Gas [     ]   Firewood [       ]   kerosene [    ]        Electricity [    ] 
8b. How did you get to know Habitat for Humanity, Ghana?………………………….….. 
9a. When did you acquire this house? (Day/month/year)………………………………... 
9b. What condition did you fulfil before being given access to the housing unit? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
9c.Which of these conditions did you find difficult in fulfiling?………………………. 
Explain your answer…………………………………………………………………….. 
9d. What was the most attractive thing in the package that made you opt for a Habitat housing 
unit?……………………………………………………………………………….. 
10a. How did you finance your project? 
a. Loan [    ]   (indicate source)………………..………………………………………….. 
b. Personal savings [      ](over how many years)………………………………………… 
c. Others [   ] (please specify)……………………………………………………………. 
10b. What was the regularity of the payment?  
    Weekly [     ]      Monthly   [    ]     Quarterly [     ]        Yearly [   ] 
 
Agreement 
11a .Do you have any legal document covering your interest in this house?  
   Yes [      ]   No [       ] 
11b. Did you sign any agreement with Habitat in the acquisition of this house?  
   Yes [      ]   No [       ] 
11 c. If yes, what are the main tenets of the agreement? 
Your obligations………………………………………………………………………… 
Habitat’s obligations………………………………………………………………….. 
11d.Are you satisfied with the terms provided in the agreement?   Yes [      ]   No [       ] 
Reason for answer……………………………………………………………… 
Housing 
12 How many rooms do you have in this house?…………………………………………. 
13. What facilities do you have in the house? (Please tick) 
Kitchen [    ] Store [   ] Water [   ] Electricity [   ] Telephone [   ] Toilet [  ] (WC/ K.V.I.P) 
14a .Did you contribute directly to the construction of your house?  
14b. What did you contribute directly to the construction of your house? Yes [   ] No [    ] 
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Labour [     ] Building material [     ] Land [       ] others (specify)……………………….. 
14c. What was the influence of such contribution?………………………………………... 
14d. Do you have the right to make extensions to the building?  Yes [      ]   No [       ] 
15a. Do you have any other problems with your house Yes [      ]   No [       ] 
If yes, please specify……………………………………………………… 
15b.What do you think you can do to solve the problem?……………………………….. 
15c. Do you contribute towards the housing project of other beneficiaries of the scheme?   Yes [      ]   No [       ] 
Reason for answer………………………………………………………………………….. 
15d. Do you have other housing units other than the one you are being interviewed on? Yes [    ] No [       ] 
16. Do you have plans to acquire additional housing units?      Yes [      ]   No [       ] 





HABITAT FOR HUMANITY GHANA 
FAMILY SELECTION FORM 
Affiliate:……………………………………………….Community……………………. 
Date of Interview…………………………………….Date of Site Visit……………….. 
 
A) GENERAL INFORMATION  
A.1 Name of Applicant…………………………A.2 Application Number…………….… 
A.3 Place of Birth………………………………4.4 Religion/Denomination……………. 
A.5 Marital Status: Single/   Married/    Divorce/   Widow/     Widower 
A.6 Name of Spouse:…………………………………………………………………….. 
A.7 Educational Background (circle one)  
       No Schooling/    Primary/     Secondary/        Tertiary 
A.8 Present Workplace:…………………………………………………………………… 
A.9 Name of Employer if employed:…………………………………………………….. 
A.10 Present Place of Residence: Name of Town:………………………………………. 
       Street Name…………………………….House Number…………………………… 
 
B) FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES 
B.1 Number of Dependants……………………………………………………………….. 
B.2 List of Dependants: 
Name Relationship Age Occupation Marital Status 
     
 
C) FINANCIAL INFORMATION: 
C.1 What is the applicant’s occupation:…………………………………………………. 
       Work condition: Full time/     Part Time/   Contracted /     Seasonal 
       On what days of the week does the applicant work?....................................................        
C.3 List sources and amounts of income for all family members 
Name Income Source Weekly Amount Monthly Amount Annual Income 
     
                                                 Total Estimated Annual Income  
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Instructions: The object of this section is to estimate the family’s total annual income. List all incomes sources. Some 
family members may have more than one source of income. List each source separately. If the income is obtained weekly 
or monthly, fill in those columns and then determine the annual estimated amount by multiplying it by 52 weeks or 
twelve months. Each column should have an annual total. 
C.4 Is there a period when the applicant earns the most during the year? Yes [   ] No [     ] 
        When?............................................................................................................................ 
C.5 How much bulk advance payments can the applicant make during peak periods to avoid default during lean 
periods………………………………………………………….. 
C.6 Does the applicant have any savings?           Yes [     ] No [        ] 
C.7 Does the applicant own any property?          Yes [     ] No [        ] 
C.8 Does the applicant own ant assets?               Yes [     ] No [        ] 
       If yes, specify………………………………………………………………………… 
C.9. Has the applicant ever taken a formal loan before? (from a bank, cooperatives, credit, institutions or employer) 
         From where?................................................................................................................ 
         From what purpose?.................................................................................................... 
        The amount borrowed……………………………………………………………….. 
         For how long (loan period)…………………………………………………………  
         Did you pay it back?   Yes [     ] No [        ] 
         If No, why?................................................................................................................. 
C.10 How much does the applicant believe he/she will be able to pay per month in pre-payments or 
repayments?.................................................................................................. 
C.11 How will the applicant be able to pay for artisans’ fee?............................................... 
 
D) THE HABITAT HOUSE 
D.1 Habitat can provide a house with a maximum size of 505 square feet 
     This maximum size includes:     2 bedrooms (size……………………) 
      A hall (size…………………..)   A kitchen (size………………………) 
     Will this provision be acceptable for your family? 
D.2 If you were unable to afford the maximum house size, would you consider accepting a smaller design?  Yes [     ] No [        
] 
D.3 Can you live without utilities such as electricity and water?  Yes [     ] No [        ] 
D.4 How many people will live in your house?..................................................................... 
D.5 How many of the people who will live in your house do you expect to live there on a temporary basis (less than five 
years) 
 
E) HOW HABITAT WORKS 
E.1 Habitat builds in partnership with beneficiary’s families.  Habitat provides durable building materials and families 
provide labour and artisan fees. Do you agree to this type performance? Yes [     ] No [        ] 
E.2 If you are selected, you will be required to work on your own house. You will also be required to work ………..days on 
other people’s homes or in communal labour before you begin construction of your own home. Do you agree to this? Yes [     
] No [        ] 
E.3 Do you have any experience in house construction?  Yes [       ] No [        ] 
E.4 Homeowners provide both the skilled and unskilled labour to construct their homes.  
Should a homeowner decide to withdraw or if the homeowner gets sacked from the programme for non-compliance with 
Habitat’s regulations, no monetary reward is given to such a homeowner for work done. Only house payments are 
refundable.   
        Do you agree to this?  Yes [     ] No [        ] 
E.5 Would you be ready, willing and able to occupy your house as soon as it is finished? 
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Yes [     ] No [        ] 
E.6 Would you agree to making monthly payments prior to building and moving into your house?  Yes [     ] No [        ] 
E.7 Habitat operates a revolving fund. The payments you make for your house will be used to build other houses. Do you 
agree with using the cement index as a means for  
adjusting for inflation and protecting the revolving fund? Yes [     ] No [        ] 
E.8 Habitat is a Christian organisation. Although it is not required to be or become a Christian in order to become 
homeowner, Habitat witnesses to the gospel of Jesus Christ? What do you think of 
this?..................................................................................................... 
 
F. THE APPLICANT’S PRESENT HOUSING SITUATION. 
F.1 Where is the house in which you currently live? (town, street, house No. and point of 
reference)…………………………………………………………………………………... 
F.2 Condition: Self owned/ family house/ rented/ staff bungalow/ putting up with a friend or family/ other. 
F.3 Name of Landlord……………………………………………………………………… 
F.4 Do you share with other relations/ or friends? Yes [     ] No [        ] 
F.5 How many rooms do you have in the house?.................................................................. 
F.6 How many rooms do you have to your self?................................................................. 
F.7 How long have you lived in you present house?........................................................... 
F.8. How long have you lived in your present community?................................................ 
F.9 Do you have a toilet in the house? Yes [     ] No [        ] 
F.10 How many people share toilet/bath facilities?…………………………………….... 
F.11 Which basic utilities do you have at your current house?.......................................... 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
F.12 Have you ever tried to solve your housing problem? Yes [     ] No [        ] 
If yes, how?.......................................................................................................................  What were the 
setbacks?.................................................................................................. 
F.13 What don’t you like about your current housing situation? 
………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
F.14 Why do you need a Habitat house?.............................................................................. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
F.15 How do you think your life will improve once you have a Habitat house? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Questionnaire administered to Habitat for Humanity Ghana. 
Kindly answer the following questions by ticking/filling where appropriate. Data collected will be treated with utmost 
confidentiality unless otherwise desired. 
Date of Interview…………………………….. 
Name of respondent…………………………………Position…………………………….. 
1a. When was Habitat for Humanity Ghana formed? (Day/month/year)………………….. 
1b. What was the objective behind its formation? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………1c. How long have you been operating in 
Ghana?………………………………………... 
2a Which areas in Ghana are your projects located?………………………………………. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
2b. What factors informed your decision to locate in these areas? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………2c. How many housing units have been provided so 
far?…………………………………. 
2d. Generally, would you say the project has been successful? Yes [     ]  No [     ] 
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Please, explain your answer………………………………………………………………... 
3a. How many people have benefited from your projects since January 2000?.................... 
3b. Into which of these categories will you place your beneficiaries? 
a. Low income [        ] b. Middle income [      ] c. High income [      ] 
3c. Why do you think that category prefers your housing scheme?……………………... 
………………………………………………………………………………………………3d. Who are the beneficiaries of your projects in a 
particular area? 
a. Indigenes [       ]      b. Non indigenes [       ] c. Both [         ] 
4a. How do you select your beneficiaries? (Please outline the process step by step) 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………4b. Is there any agreement signed between you and the beneficiaries? Yes [   ] No [     ] 
If yes, what are the main tenets?…………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………If no, 
why……………………………………………………………………………….. 
4c. What are the terms of payment for the housing units?……………………………….. 
4d. How easy is it for the beneficiaries to honour their financial commitments? 
Reason(s)…………………………………………………………………………………… 
Housing 
5a. What range of housing types do you have for your clients? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
5b. What are the prices for these housing types? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
6a What  is the initial fee charged per client?……………………………………………… 
6b. Which of these housing types is the most preferred?………………………………..... 
Reason for such preference……………………………………………………………….. 
6c. What type of building materials do you normally use?  
a. Foundation: Cement [   ] Laterite [   ] others (please specify)…………………………... 
b. Wall: Sandcrete [   ] Landcrete [    ] Mud [   ] Wood [   ] others (please specify)……… 
c. Roofing: Aluminium[   ]Asbestos[   ]Tiles[   ]Concrete[   ]Others(please specify)……. 
6d. Does a client have the option of determining what material to use for his building? 
                Yes [         ]       No [           ] 
If yes, under what conditions is this right granted? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
7a. How do you finance your housing projects? (Please specify with examples) 
………………………………………………………………………………………………7b. How do you manage the funds you receive from the 
houses you provide? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
8a. Do you operate mortgage transaction?  Yes [      ]   No [        ] 
8b. If yes, what are the terms of the mortgage transaction? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………8c. Is there any item you would like to amend in the 
mortgage agreement?  
Yes [      ]   No [        ] 
Reasons for answer……………….……………………………………………………….. 
9. Do you engage in other projects apart from housing? Yes [      ]   No [        ] 
 If yes, please specify……………………………………………………………………… 
10a. What problems do you face in your housing?  
………………………………………………………………………………………………          
10b. How do you think these problems can be solved? ……… 
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APPENDIX C 
Questionnaire administered to traditional heads of case study areas. 
Kindly answer the following questions by ticking/filling where appropriate. Data collected will be treated with utmost 
confidentiality unless otherwise desired. 
Date of Interview…………………………….. 
Name of Stool………………………………..Area of jurisdiction………………………... 
Name of respondent…………………………………..Position…………………………… 
1a. In terms of housing delivery, what do you provide? 
 a. Building materials, [     ] please specify………………….……………………………. 
b. Land [     ] 
c. Others, please specify…………………………………………………………………… 
1b. How have you identified the boundaries of lands in this locality? 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………………... 
2. What is the procedure for acquiring land for housing development? (Please outline the process step by 
step)………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
3a. Is this procedure different from the process of acquiring land for other purposes? 
     Yes [      ]    No [      ] 
3b. Do you have documents covering grants of land for development? 
     Yes [      ]    No [      ] 
Reason for answer………………………………………………………………………….. 
3c. If yes to Q.3b, what are the main components of such a document? 
a. Term [     ] (for how long)………………………………………………………………. 
b. Consideration [      ] (average amount)………………………………………………….. 
c. Parties (signatories of traditional authority)……………………………………………. 
d. Others……………………………………………………………………………………. 
4. What measures have been put in place to prevent land litigation? (If any) 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
5a. How many parcels of land have you given to Habitat for Humanity Ghana (HFHG)? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………  
5b. What was the consideration paid for these lands?.......................   …………………… 
5c. What legal interest does HFHG have in such lands? 
     Allodial [      ]  Freehold  [      ]   Leasehold  [      ]  Others (Please specify)…………… 
7. Will you give more lands to HFHG?      Yes [      ]    No [      ] 
Reason for answer………………………………………………………………………….. 
8. In what other way(s) have you contributed to the success of HFHG? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
9. What other things do you expect from Habitat for Humanity Ghana? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
10. What other benefit do you foresee from the housing scheme of Habitat? 
 
Thank you. 


